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Abstract
Brands not only enhance the positive impact of marketing initiatives, but also buffer the firm
from the full consequences of unexpected and negative market shifts. While this protective effect
has been demonstrated for firm-specific events (e.g., product recalls, public relations crises), its
impact has not been observed in response to market-wide environmental shifts. Our study
demonstrates the buffering properties of strong brands in exactly such a context: the passing of
new legislation. By examining responses to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
we show that (1) firms exhibit a rapid and homogeneous response as they comply and adjust
strategy to a new environmental incentive/cost structure; (2) from a marketing perspective, this
homogeneity in competitive responses leads to a systemic decrease in marketing efficiency; and
(3) stronger brands existing prior to this environmental shift help buffer their companies from
this loss in efficiency. We further show that this advantage only holds for the strongest of brands
in the market.
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The Buffering Effect of Brands for Companies Facing Legislative Homogenization:
Evidence from the Introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley
Felipe Thomaz, Leonce Bargeron, John Hulland, and Chad Zutter 1

Strong brands have been shown to often be catalytic in nature, enhancing the positive effects of
other marketing initiatives. Furthermore, brands can ameliorate the negative impact of
undesirable situations, such as service failures (Zboja and Vorhees 2006), negative publicity
(Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000), and product recalls (Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen
2008; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Meike Eilert 2013). Given this joint benefit of both
reinforcing positive and dampening negative firm consequences, as well as their own direct
positive effects on firm outcomes, it is not at all surprising that “building strong brands has
become a top priority for many organizations” (Keller 2001, p. 1). Moreover, since many
managers are risk averse, understanding when brands can be expected to attenuate the effects of
negative outcomes is particularly important.
The vast majority of past research attempting to understand the buffering role played by
brands in the face of negative events has been firm-specific (e.g., a firm’s recalled products, a
firm’s service failures). While this work is important, it does not assess the potential power of
brands to soften the negative consequences of broader environmental shifts (i.e., systematic
rather than firm-specific effects). Notably, studies considering the role of marketing assets in
protecting the firm and investors from systematic equity risk have led to diverging findings.
While Rego, Billet, and Morgan (2009) find that strong brands can protect the firm from
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downside systematic equity risk, Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer (2011) conclude instead that
gains in brand quality may increase systematic risk. While restricted to the firm’s economic
environment, these studies are evidence that brands can alter the firm’s exposure to market-wide
environmental shifts, for better or worse. In this paper, we examine the impact of a different
environment’s systematic shift on firms’ marketing performance—the introduction of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States in 2002—highlighting how this type of systematic
shock impacts the firm’s marketing efficiency.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the environment on the firm. First, the firm’s
ability to adapt and respond to its external environment has been considered as equivalent to the
process of strategic management itself (Chakravarthy 1982). Second, depending on the
theoretical perspective, the environment has been said to either influence or totally determine
firm conduct (Hunt and Morgan 1995). In this context, Hunt and Morgan (1995, p. 12)
emphasize that “a firm’s comparative advantage in resources can be neutralized by the actions of
consumers, government, or competitors . . . governmental action can destroy the value-creating
potential of a resource through law or regulation.” Ironically, legislative change is the
environmental change factor most likely to be met with minimal resistance from managers—and
thus result in the fastest behavioral adjustment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1997). Given
the frictionless, systemic (rather than targeted), and potentially negative nature of governmental
action, as well as the general importance of environmental factors for firm conduct, our review
leads us to consider the following question: Can a strong brand buffer the firm from negative
consequences arising from government-driven environmental change?
In this paper, we aim to answer this question by showing that (1) governmental action
through new legislation elicits a rapid and homogeneous response from firms as they comply and
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adjust strategy to a new environmental incentive/cost structure; (2) from a marketing perspective,
this homogeneity in competitive responses leads to a systemic decrease in marketing efficiency;
and (3) stronger brands existing prior to this environmental shift help buffer companies from this
loss in efficiency. Specifically, we examine how the introduction of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) and the associated effects on firms’ costs and incentive structures led to a shift in the
relative emphasis that firms place on two critical marketing activities: value creation (e.g.,
developing and delivering new products) and value appropriation (e.g., extracting profits from
existing products). Consistent with existing evidence in the finance and accounting literatures
that SOX has diminished risk-taking within firms, we hypothesize and then identify a shift away
from riskier investments in value-creating activities and toward less risky value appropriation. In
light of this shift, we predict—and show—that firms experienced a decrease in marketing
efficiency in response to this systemic incentive to engage in value appropriation activities.
Finally, we provide evidence demonstrating that previous marketing investments in brand equity
undertaken by the firm can help protect it from this negative consequence.
We begin with a discussion of SOX and related research that finds decreased risk-taking
in US firms resulting from this legislation, followed by an examination of the resulting resource
allocation decision in which firms engaged (made evident by shifts in their strategic emphasis
trajectories). We then introduce our methodology for this study, taking advantage of a naturally
occurring quasi-experimental interrupted time series empirical design (Nunnally 1960), with the
introduction of SOX serving as our “treatment.” Finally, we present our results followed by a
discussion of their implications for marketing.

5

Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in the wake of a series of accounting scandals
involving companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia. The apparent intent of this law
was to prevent such scandals in the future and to restore investor confidence in the veracity of
US financial markets by making firms’ directors personally responsible for corporate misdeeds
and by requiring firms to establish, disclose, and assess internal control systems. However, its
introduction has not gone without criticism. One recurring concern is that the combined
requirements of compliance, along with potential criminal charges for noncompliance, have led
to an environment that discourages investment in new projects, innovation, and risk-taking
(Michaels 2003; Greenspan 2003). In a 2006 interview, economist and Nobel Prize winner
Milton Friedman highlighted this concern, stating, “Sarbanes-Oxley says to every entrepreneur,
‘For God’s sake don’t innovate. Don’t take chances because down will come the hatchet. We’re
going to knock your head off’” (Gerstein 2006).
A number of studies in accounting and finance have examined whether the introduction
of SOX has increased the cost of risk and, therefore, decreased risk-taking by publicly traded US
firms (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2007; Shadab 2008; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009). Their
findings suggest that risk-taking has decreased in the period following SOX, as manifested by (1)
decreased investment, (2) reduced standard deviations of stock returns (a measure of equity risk),
and (3) increased levels of cash holdings.
Two key clauses in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation support this prediction of reduced
risk-taking behavior by US firms. First, at the firm board level, SOX increases the role of
independent directors while simultaneously introducing potential criminal charges for corporate
misdeeds. Furthermore, both the chief executive and chief financial officers must certify the
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veracity of their firm’s financial statements, once again facing potential criminal charges for any
knowing or willful violation. These changes directly discourage the approval of risky activities,
such as new product development and R&D, which entail specialized, project-specific
knowledge that necessitates a greater investment of time throughout the corporate hierarchy to
evaluate and monitor.
Second, Section 404 of the legislation and the resulting SEC rules require firms to
evaluate and disclose the adequacy of their internal controls and provide reasonable assurance
that misstatements will be avoided or identified. Riskier investments entail greater uncertainty.
Therefore, insofar as greater uncertainty requires more extensive testing and evaluation and is
more likely to result in misstatements, these requirements impose greater costs on riskier
investments. As a result, risky investments—already discouraged by boardroom composition and
the criminalization of misdeeds—are further discouraged by Section 404.
It is important to recognize that SOX legislation does not directly impose regulation on
the marketing function. Thus, any shifts in efficiency that result from the introduction of the new
law should reflect the homogeneous strategic use of marketing discussed below, rather than any
direct change in allowable marketing initiatives. Obviously, it is not always the case that
legislation has no direct bearing on marketing operation. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act
of 1936 (Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526; Luchs et al. 2010), as well as the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (Bates 1969), had direct implications for marketing management
by amending antitrust law to include provisions against discriminatory pricing and by prohibiting
firms from advertising tobacco products on television and the radio (respectively). In these latter
situations, it would be necessary to also consider shifts in the marketing mix. However, such is
not the case for examining the effects of SOX.

7

Hypotheses
Strategic marketing emphasis
The trade-off between exploration (identifying and developing innovative products) and
exploitation (extracting profits from the market) has a long history in the strategic management
domain (March 1991). An extreme emphasis on either activity at the expense of the other can be
suboptimal: excessive exploration can lead to an accrual of too many costs without the
realization of accompanying benefits, while too much focus on exploitation leads to a shallow
position of underdeveloped ideas and a lack of competitive distinction in the longer run.
More recently, this tension has evolved into a contrast between “value creation” and
“value appropriation” (Mizik and Jacobson 2003), serving as mechanisms through which
marketing brings value to the firm. Value creation represents a strategy of innovation, where a
steady flow of innovative products maintains a long term firm advantage, but also entails more
risk. Value appropriation represents a lower risk strategy of extracting profits while maintaining
the firm’s current advantage by introducing competitive barriers (e.g., strong brands). The
concept of strategic marketing emphasis, as introduced by Mizik and Jacobson (2003, p. 65),
describes the relative interplay between these two alternatives as “complements and imperfect
substitutes.” They further note that while “value creation influences the potential magnitude of
[an] advantage; value appropriation influences the amount of the advantage the firm is able to
capture and the length of time the advantage persists.” Most firms combine value creation and
value appropriation activities; a firm’s strategic marketing emphasis reflects its relative emphasis
on value creation versus value appropriation.

8

It is important to note that new product launches—typically attended by large
commercialization expenditures—are part of value appropriation, not value creation. When firms
focus on the latter, they invest in asset creation (generally in the form of R&D) prior to
introducing those assets (products) into the market. In doing so, these firms are following a
strategy of innovation with an eye toward the development of a strong portfolio of future
products. Once marketing investments (e.g., demand creation, branding) for a specific product
begin, however, the firm has shifted its emphasis for this product from value creation to value
appropriation.
While previous research has shown that strategic marketing emphasis varies by firm and
industry (Mizik and Jacobson 2003), our contention is that a shift in the amount of institutionally
induced environmental risk has a systematic effect on the relative strategic marketing emphasis
of all firms. The introduction of SOX increased perceived environmental risk (both at the
personal and corporate levels). This increased risk affected both financial and marketing
decision-making within firms. From the financial perspective, firms reduced their investment in
riskier R&D activities and increased their cash holdings (e.g., Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009).
What we are proposing here is that SOX also shifted firms’ relative marketing emphases away
from value creation (i.e., R&D investment) and toward value appropriation (e.g., advertising).
Thus, both the financial and marketing decisions undertaken by firms in the post-SOX period
demonstrate a desire to shift away from riskier R&D investment and toward lower risk
alternatives (e.g., cash, value appropriation). Empirical evidence for the financial shift away
from R&D has already been provided (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2007; Shadab 2008; Bargeron,
Lehn, and Zutter 2009). In contrast, the corresponding marketing shift has not been previously
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studied. We argue that firms, in fact, increase investment in the form of increased value
appropriation.
Using a cost-benefit framework, and recognizing that SOX did not materially change the
benefits received by firms, it follows that the perceived cost increases introduced by SOX likely
drove shifts in both firm- and individual-level behaviors. At the firm level, SOX increased the
relative cost of risky investment without increasing the relative benefit. 2 This shift was
exacerbated by the personal cost-benefit analysis of executives and directors who now face
increased criminal liability. Thus, firms’ managers likely shifted their relative emphases away
from value creation in response to the higher cost of risk it entails, and toward value
appropriation initiatives with lower attendant risks. In other words, although legislation
attempting to increase transparency and oversight of firms may not necessarily increase the
relative cost of risk, the specific structure of the regulations and penalties legislated in SOX does
decrease incentives for risk-taking. As such, SOX increased the perceived cost of value creation
relative to value appropriation, and we expect to see that firms shifted their strategic marketing
emphases toward value appropriation and away from value creation following the introduction of
SOX. Thus:
H1

Firms will on average shift to a greater strategic marketing emphasis on
value appropriation (versus value creation) following the introduction of
SOX.

2

Although a decrease in risky investment by other firms as a result of the increased cost of risky investment from
SOX might increase the marginal benefit of risk-taking for a focal firm in an equilibrium analysis, aggregate risktaking would still be lower after SOX. We do not hypothesize that every US firm will decrease risk-taking, but that
on average US firms will do so. Similarly, we do not hypothesize that multisegment firms will pursue the same
pattern across all segments. Managers will determine how to spread the adjustments to risk-taking across segments
depending on the relative costs and benefits of risk within each segment’s industry.
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Marketing efficiency
For firms with set or constrained marketing budgets, the increased risk associated with value
creation, as described above, will shift resources toward value appropriation. As a result,
investment in marketing actions increases, with brand-building advertising being a foremost
example (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). One potential consequence of increased marketing
spending, however, is a decline in marketing efficiency. Marketing efficiency is the ratio of a
firm’s marketing performance (outputs) to the inputs consumed in its generation (Vorhies and
Morgan 2003). Thus, marketing efficiency is maximized when the firm realizes greater gains
(usually in terms of revenues) with the minimum necessary amount of associated costs.
If we consider an individual firm, the shock provided by SOX should lead it to increase
its relative level of marketing spending, as argued earlier. Further, due to the separation of
finance and marketing decisions within the firm, total expenditures on marketing (R&D plus
marketing expense) are likely to be somewhat “sticky” from one year to the next. (“Stickiness”
refers to the resistance on the part of marketing managers to decrease marketing expenditures.
This resistance stems from any private information they have about the effectiveness of
marketing expenditures as well as self-interest in keeping their budgets large.) As a result of this
stickiness, a decrease in R&D spending coupled with a desire on the part of a firm’s marketing
department to retain as large a budget as possible for next year will lead to an increase in
marketing expense (e.g., more advertising). 3 The firm might anticipate that this will lead to an

3

For our main result, we do not require stickiness because we examine relative—rather than absolute—marketing
expenditure. Given our main result, stickiness is only one way to ensure increased marketing spending after SOX. In
fact, so long as capital rationing exists within the firm, then spending on marketing will increase after SOX. For
example, if before SOX the firm is capital rationed, then the marginal utility of R&D spending > 0 and the marginal
utility of marketing spending > 0 [MU(R&D) = MU(Marketing) > 0 in equilibrium]. After the SOX shock, which
increases the marginal cost of R&D, R&D spending will go down and marketing spending will increase until, in
equilibrium, the new marginal utilities are once again equal. The marginal utilities of each will be lower after SOX
than before SOX.
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increase in the revenues it generates, leaving the firm’s marketing efficiency at some new level
that is dependent on firm, market, and industry idiosyncrasies. However, this shift in marketing
spending is not happening in isolation. As a broad-based legislative change, SOX can be
expected to have a systematic impact on all firms, regardless of industry. What, then, is the net
impact on an individual firm’s marketing efficiency?
To more concretely illustrate this effect of SOX, we focus the following discussion on
advertising expenditures, but our arguments apply equally to other forms of marketing
expenditures as well. Previous research has shown that increasing the number of competing
brands advertising in a market and/or the amount they spend on advertising will decrease a focal
firm’s share of voice, thereby undermining consumers’ ability to recall information from ads
(Keller 1987; Burke and Srull 1988). This results in reduced effectiveness of the focal firm’s
advertising, ultimately diminishing its revenues. Furthermore, competitive advertisement has
been argued to “provide information that serves to dissipate [a firm’s] isolating mechanisms,” or
its ability to appropriate value through activities like brand-based advertising (Mizik and
Jacobson 2003, p. 66).
In response, marketing managers typically adjust their advertising expenditures so that
“their messages can be heard through the noise” (Little 1979, p. 1). Thus, as competitive
advertising increases, the focal firm must also increase its advertising expenditures in order to
maintain an equal amount of “above noise” exposure (i.e., to maintain a parity share of voice in
its market).
Taken together, these observations suggest that with the introduction of SOX, firms are
likely to increase their advertising spending, both as a direct response to SOX and as a
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competitive response. 4 The result of this, however, will be a reduction in advertising
effectiveness. Of course, this loss of effectiveness does not need to be restricted to the
advertising domain. Competitive reaction can also happen as a result of changes in other
marketing instruments, such as price, product features, and promotions (e.g., Leeflang and
Wittink 1992, 1996). More generally:
H2

Firms will, on average, experience lower levels of marketing efficiency
following the introduction of SOX versus the preceding period.

Although H2 represents our overall prediction for firms in general, previous research also
indicates that brand familiarity plays a crucial role in improving brand and advertising recall in
cluttered advertising environments (Kent and Allen 1993). For example, Keller (1993) argues
that customer-based brand equity represents the differential effect of brand knowledge on
consumer responses to brand-related marketing expenditures. This advantage has been noted in
past research on responses to advertising, demonstrating that consumers with positive
predispositions toward a brand require fewer exposures to a marketing message, and less
reinforcement, in order to meet the brand’s communication objectives (Ray 1982; Rossiter and
Percy 1987). From this perspective, it follows that for strong brands (i.e., those with strong,
positive brand equity), brand-based advertising (and other marketing investments) will be more
effective than the advertising of weaker competitors who do not have the same levels of brand
awareness and image.

4

In fact, observations on American firms around the introduction of SOX corroborate this notion. While the average
reported advertising expense decreased by 2.3 percent from 2000 to 2001 (or $0.83 million less for the average firm
in those years), it increased by 11.76 percent from 2001 to 2002 (or an additional $4 million on average), the year
that SOX was introduced. In a longer window, examining the decade preceding and following SOX, we observe that
the average firm advertising expense reported in the post-SOX era was 52 percent higher than those reported in the
pre-SOX period (this is $17 million more per year for the average firm).
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This differential efficacy of advertising suggests that an ongoing firm strategy of
investing in brand equity could serve as a protective measure against an eventual risk-increasing
legislative change, such as the introduction of SOX. As argued earlier, the introduction of SOX
provides a systematic incentive for firms to advertise as a means to appropriate value, thus
increasing the clutter of advertising and ultimately reducing the efficiency of marketing
investment. However, a firm that enters into this environment with higher brand equity should
expect a greater “probability of brand choice, as well as greater consumer loyalty, and decreased
vulnerability to competitive marketing actions” (Keller 1993, p. 8). The benefit of greater a priori
investment in brand equity for marketing efficiency, then, should be double-barreled: first
through the increased efficacy of the brand’s own advertising, and second through a reduction in
the effectiveness of competitive advertising spending. Thus:
H3

Firms that invested in brand-building activities prior to the introduction of
SOX will have higher levels of marketing efficiency than other firms
following the introduction of SOX.

Method
Data Sources and Firm Sample
Financial accounting and stock data were gathered from Compustat and CRSP, respectively,
while data on annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) were collected for each year
from the International Monetary Fund’s website.
The sample used in this study is in the form of a panel consisting of 17 annual
observations per firm, running from 1994 to 2010 (inclusive) and providing nine years of
observations prior to the enactment of SOX in 2002 plus an additional eight years of post-SOX
enactment observations. We use this time frame to capture both firms’ pre-SOX investment
tendencies and firms’ adjustments to the enactment of SOX. A total of 1,441 firms (939 in the
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United States and 502 in the United Kingdom), representing 52 different industries (as
determined by two-digit SIC codes, excluding financials and utilities due to their highly
regulated behavior) are included in our study. 5 By virtue of falling outside of SOX jurisdiction,
the UK-based firms serve as our control group for the analyses that follow.

Measures
Dependent Variables
Strategic Marketing Emphasis. Our first dependent variable is a measure of the firm’s strategic
marketing emphasis, representing the firm’s strategic choice between the creation and the
appropriation of value (Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2009).
This conceptualization has the advantage of capturing actual (rather than declared) firm strategy
(Harrison, Hall, and Nargundkar 1993). Furthermore, it can be assessed using secondary data,
rather than requiring primary data collection. Specifically, we calculate strategic marketing
emphasis (for firm i at time t) as follows:
SME ti = (Marketing Spending Intensityti – R&D ti ) / Assets ti
(1)
Following previous research (Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Luo 2008; Chakravarty and
Grewal 2012), we use a firm’s selling and general administrative (SGA) expenses minus its
R&D expenses as a proxy for the firm’s marketing spending intensity. While this initially may
seem odd, by removing the R&D component of SGA, we are left with a more complete measure
of marketing investment, which includes items such as promotions and sales force costs as well

5

This includes all US-based firms in Compustat that reported non-zero R&D investment for the time frame of
interest. Firms with no R&D expenditures across the entire 17-year time period were excluded. Firms reporting
fewer than 12 years of data or less than $75 million in assets (to which SOX does not apply) were also excluded.
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as advertising. While SGA has been used in past research as the sole and unmodified proxy for
marketing expenditure, this purified version of SGA also allows us to examine the strategic
trade-off between marketing and R&D investments. 6 As per Mizik and Jacobson’s (2003)
original conceptualization, marketing spending intensity and R&D correspond to the firm’s use
of a value appropriation and value creation emphasis, respectively.

Marketing Efficiency. Our second dependent variable is a measure of the firm’s marketing
efficiency, or its ability to convert marketing spending into revenues. Defined as the ratio of
marketing performance outcomes to the resources consumed (Vorhies and Morgan 2003), we
calculate marketing efficiency as:
Marketing Efficiency ti = Sales ti / Marketing Spending Intensity ti

(2)

The use of sales as a marketing performance indicator is appropriate as it reflects
“enhanced values of the firm’s products in the minds of current and potential customers . . . [as
well as being] crucial to building market share” (Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999, p. 552).
Marketing spending intensity, as described previously, provides a holistic view of marketing
effort by accounting for advertising, promotional, and selling efforts, representing the sales
revenue value to the firm of a dollar spent on its marketing.

Independent Variables
Time-based SOX-related trend variables. Our main independent variables of interest are two
trend variables created to indicate the period preceding the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley

6

Compustat includes R&D expense (XRD, item 46) as one of the components of the reported SGA (XSGA, item
132). Thus, the former must be removed from SGA for the constructed marketing emphasis measure to be
meaningful in capturing the intended trade-off between value creation and value appropriation.
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legislation (1994–2001) and the period following its introduction (2003–2010). These variables
are coded according to the scheme presented in table 1, which allows for the interpretation of the
resulting coefficients as a linear rate of change in strategic emphasis for each of these periods
(see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, pp. 178–80). The advantage of this approach is that it allows
for the existence of a single trend in strategic marketing emphasis behavior spanning the entire
period of our study (1994–2010), but also for the possibility of a fundamental shift in strategic
marketing emphasis between the pre- and post-SOX periods. We use 2002—the year that
Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced as law—as the reference point. This facilitates our discussion of
legislative interference as a potential source of disruption resulting in shifts in strategic emphasis.
Furthermore, because SOX was passed in late July 2002, we define each year as August to July
(e.g., the 2002 year begins on August 1, 2001, and ends on July 31, 2002). 7

Table 1: Coding Scheme for Piece-Wise Linear Model
Year
‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10
Pre-Sox −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Post-Sox 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Notes: Interpretation of coefficients (π s ):
- The intercept reflects the firm’s strategic marketing emphasis (SME) in 2002, the year SOX was introduced (π 0i ).
- The coefficient for the pre-SOX period shows the linear rate of change (growth rate) in SME for the period
preceding SOX (π 1i ).
- The coefficient for the post-SOX period shows the linear rate of change (growth rate) in SME for the period
following SOX (π 2i ).

Control Variables

7

As a robustness check, we have also used 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004 as alternative reference years. We find that
based on BIC and Pseudo-R2, models using 2002 and 2003 as the reference provide the best fit. The goodness of fit
for models using 2003 as a reference year is not surprising given the long-term nature of the investments being
discussed, such that some of the changes taking place in the firm spill over into the following year. For sake of
brevity, and given that SOX was introduced in 2002, we discuss only the results from models using the 2002
reference year. However, the 2003 reference year results are very similar.
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Because H1 is based on risk-related arguments, it is important to control for other known
variables that might also influence a firm’s risk-taking posture in order to isolate the effects of
the SOX legislation. Consistent with previous studies looking at the effects of SOX (Cohen, Dey,
and Lys 2007; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009), we account for the following time-specific
factors: the health of the economy; the levels of risk and opportunity in the financial markets;
and the firm’s size, debt, and profitability. Each of these variables is mean-centered by firm.

Firm Size. We use the number of employees (Compustat) as our measure of the firm’s size for
each year the firm is present in the dataset.

Debt. This measure is the ratio of a firm’s total debt to the average market value of assets. It
serves as an additional indicator of the firm’s existing risk profile. The values of DEBT used in
the model are both time- and firm-specific.
EBIT. We use the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to average book value of debt as our
measure of the firm’s profitability, a factor that we expect to influence the firm’s resource
allocation decisions, and that therefore could explicitly affect SME. The values of EBIT used in
the model are both time- and firm-specific.

Lagged Change in Gross Domestic Product. Measured as the percentage change in the country’s
GDP for each year in the panel, we use this variable to control for the health of the economy,
lagging the measure one and two years in order to capture its lingering effects. Each lagged
version of this variable is a time-varying predictor; however, all firms in the US sample share the
same values in any given period (and the same is true for all of the UK firms).
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Index Returns. We utilize a stock index return of the S&P 500 for American firms and the FTSE
100 for UK-based firms to account for existing levels of risk and opportunity in the financial
markets, as well as a possible alternative explanation for strategic shifts, such as the economic
recession of 2001. This is again a common value that varies by year across all firms within the
US or UK markets.

USA. This is an indicator variable with a value of 1 for companies that are based in the United
States and, as such, potentially affected by SOX when the legislation was introduced in 2002.
The reference value of zero is reserved for UK-based companies, which are unaffected by SOX.

Marketing Intensity HHI. We use a Herfindahl index of marketing intensity to control for
changing levels in competitive marketing spending. This industry-level value is calculated as the
sum of the squares of the shares of marketing intensity by firms i belonging to the same industry
k (two-digit SIC code) such that:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

𝐾𝐾

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 2
= ��
�
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=1

Brand Equity. We rely on adjusted revenue premiums as a measure of the firm’s brand equity,
adapted from the work by Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin (2003). We calculate brand equity as
follows:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = �

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 )
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 )
� − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �
�
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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where i is the focal firm, t is time, and k is the industry in which the focal firm operates. Our
measure of firm i’s brand equity captures the extent to which that firm is able to extract a price
premium above the lowest performing firm in the same industry, assuming that the firm with the
lowest price premium is an appropriate stand-in for generic or unbranded products (Ailawadi,
Lehmann, and Neslin 2003). The introduction of cost of goods sold in the above formula allows
us to capture the supplier-side benefits of strong brands (Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2003;
Leone et al. 2006) as well as account for strong brands that might rely on an overall low-cost
strategy by emphasizing a volume advantage in our calculation. 8

Model Development
Strategic Marketing Emphasis
We employ a piecewise linear growth model with time-varying covariates using a hierarchical
multivariate linear modeling (HMLM) approach (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). This technique is
appropriate due to (1) its ability to handle nested data, which we make use of by applying our
final model to a reported 17 years of history for each of the 1,441 firms in our sample (i.e.,
repeated measures for both the IVs and the DV are nested within firm); (2) its ability to function
in the presence of unbalanced data (not all firms are present for the full 17-year panel); and (3)
its known application in studies of individual change.
The piecewise linear model is advantageous in this situation as a tool for structural break
analysis, allowing us to confirm whether firms altered their investment trajectories as a result of
the introduction of SOX. In most applications, this approach would lead to the identification of

8

While our overall analysis is restricted to firms with assets above $75 million, as described in the data
discussion above, this measure was constructed with all firms available in Compustat, such that the MIN
value of revenue premiums can belong to firms under the $75 million threshold (where SOX is not
applicable).
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firm-specific change points (i.e., time intervals that mark a departure for the firm through new
data generating processes, changes in regimes, etc.). However, given our interest in a naturally
occurring quasi-experimental shock to our time series, and knowledge of the specific time
interval for the introduction of SOX (i.e., fiscal year 2002), we can instead check whether the
1,441 firms in our dataset suffered a structural break in this specific time interval.
Because strategic marketing emphasis is a time series measure in a panel structure, we
check whether each firm’s time series in the panel is stationary or evolving using a Fisher-type
panel unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller lags (0, 1, and 2) in order to account for
potentially different autoregressive processes across firms and to handle the unbalanced nature of
our panel. If the time series is stationary, strategic marketing emphasis can be modeled under its
natural distribution. However, if it is an evolving time series, it must be first-differenced in order
to make it stationary, altering the distribution being modeled. Empirically examining this issue,
our results indicate that all time series in our data demonstrate stationary strategic marketing
emphasis and follow a normal distribution, meaning that no transformation is necessary.
The basic form of our model—ignoring controls and moderators—is as follows:
Y ti = π 0i + π 1i (Pre-Sox t ) + π 2i (Post-Sox t ) + e ti

(3)

where Y ti is the value of the strategic marketing emphasis (SME) measure for firm i at time t, π 0i
represents the firm-specific value of SME at time 0 (which we define as 2002, the year SOX was
introduced), π 1i captures the firm-specific linear annual rate of change in SME over the pre-SOX
period, and π 2i captures the firm-specific post-SOX linear annual rate of change in SME. Last, e ti
is the error component with distribution ~N(0, σ2).
When the control variables are included, we obtain the following equations:
Level 1
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Level 1 represents the time-specific nature of the relationship between SME and the IVs given
firm i and expanded to account for industry k, with the control variables now included.
Strategic Marketing Emphasis

tik

= π 0ik + π 1ik (Pre-SOX t ) + π 2ik (Post-SOX t ) + π 3ik (Pre-

SOX t *USA) + π 4ik (Post-SOX t *USA) + π 5ik (Firm Size ti ) + π 6ik (Debt ti ) + π 7ik
(EBIT ti ) + π 8 (Change in GDP Lagged 1yr t ) + π 9 (Change in GDP Lagged 2yrs t ) +
π 10 (Index Return Lagged 1yr t ) + π 11 (Index Return Lagged 2yrs t ) + π 12 (USA) + e tik
(4)
where each variable is given at time t for firm i in industry k, and e tik is the level 1 error
component with distribution ~N(0, σ2).
Level 2
Level 2 represents the firm level. We model the firm-specific (but time-independent) effects for
firm i as a combination (for π 0ik ) of an overall, across-firm average (β 00k ) plus a random effect
(r 0ik ) that represents a firm-specific deviation from its industry average. This firm-specific effect
on strategic emphasis is partially explained by an autoregressive component of strategic
emphasis, for t − 1 and t − 2 (β 01k and β 02k , respectively):
π 0ik = β 00k + β 01k (SME t–1ik ) + β 02k (SME t–2ik ) + r 0ik

(5a)

π qik = β q0k

(5b)

for q = 1, … , 12

The inclusion of autoregressive components for strategic emphasis allows us to capture
the path dependency in strategic emphasis and budget allocation within a firm. An average firm
cannot make immediate adjustments; therefore, leftover investment commitments are partially
explained by previous levels of investment and allocation priorities. These values are lagged
twice in order to match the periodicity of our other lagged variables (e.g., Change in GDP and
Index Returns).
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Level 3
Level 3 represents the industry level. We model the industry-specific (but time- and firmindependent) effects for industry k (on β 00k ) as a combination of an overall, across-industry
average (γ 000 ) plus a random effect (u 00k ) that represents an industry-specific deviation from the
overall average:
β 00k = γ 000 + u 00k
β q0k = γ q0k

(6a)
for q = 1, … , 12

(6b)

Marketing Efficiency
In constructing a model for marketing efficiency, we must take into consideration a number of
characteristics present in our data, which still conform to the panel structure we presented earlier,
as well as the distributional characteristics of marketing efficiency. First, and similar to our
previous model, we account for firm and industry unobserved heterogeneity by using an HMLM
approach (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Second, we check whether marketing efficiency is
stationary using a panel unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (0, 1, and 2) lags.
Results indicate that all panels in our data have stationary marketing efficiency (p < 0.001),
meaning that no transformation is necessary.
However, while marketing efficiency is a continuous, nondiscrete variable, its
distribution is not normal. Initial analysis revealed that a lognormal transformation of marketing
efficiency would properly normalize the data. Thus, we have log transformed the marketing
efficiency dependent variable as the log of Market Efficiency presented earlier. The model for
marketing efficiency itself follows a similar form to the one presented for strategic marketing
emphasis, but with some important changes (as noted below, following the equations):
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Level 1
Marketing Efficiency tik = π 0ik + π 1ik (Pre-SOX t ) + π 2ik (Post-SOX t ) + π 3ik (Pre-SOX t * USA)
+ π 4ik (Post-SOX t * USA) + π 5ik (Marketing Intensity HHI) + π 6ik (Marketing
Intensity HHI * Post-SOX t ) + π 7ik (Brand Equity) + π 8 (Brand Equity * USA) + π 9
(Brand Equity * Post-SOX) + π 10 (Brand Equity * Post-SOX * USA) + π 11ik (Brand
Equity2) + π 12 (Brand Equity2 * USA) + π 13 (Brand Equity2 * Post-SOX) + π 14 (Brand
Equity2 * Post-SOX * USA) + π 15ik (Sales Lagged 1yr it ) + π 16ik (Sales Lagged 2yrs it )
+ π 17 (Change in GDP Lagged 2yrs t ) + π 18 (Index Return Lagged 1yr t ) + π 19 (Index
Return Lagged 2yrs t ) + π 20ik (Marketing Intensity) + π 21 (USA) + e tik
(7)
Level 2
π 0ik = β 00k + β 01k (Pre-SOX t ) + β 02k (Post-SOX t ) + β 03k (Brand Equity) + β 04k (Marketing
(8a)

Intensity) + r 0ik
π qik = β q0k

for q = 1, … , 9, 14, 15, 16

(8b)

Level 3
β 00k = γ 000 + γ 001 (Marketing Intensity HHI) + u 00k

(9a)

β qik = γ q0k

(9b)

for q = 1, … , 9, 14, 15, 16

The model for marketing efficiency described in equation (7) incorporates a number of
new independent variables and controls. First, we include terms for Brand Equity and Brand
Equity squared as key independent variables. Because firms with greater brand equity may be at
least partially shielded from the impact of SOX, adding the squared term allows us to capture
any nonlinearities in this relationship. While we do not formally hypothesize a differential
impact for very large brands, Luo, Raithel, and Wiles (2013) have shown that increasing brand
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ratings are also accompanied by a lower dispersion of brand ratings (or higher agreement in
ratings across consumers) and that this combination increases the “risk-mitigating” effect of
strong brands. As such, these very large brands might have a multiplicative edge (through higher
and more consistent value) in buffering the firm from the impact of SOX.
New controls include the industry-level concentration of marketing intensity in order to
account for the fact that the efficiency of a firm’s marketing dollars is conditional on competitive
activity. The lagged values of the firm’s sales are also included because efficiency is a salesbased measure, and therefore susceptible to inertia-like effects not directly related to the
marketing efforts we study.
We also include the firm’s own marketing intensity in the model, since the logic
presented so far describes the relationship wherein the introduction of SOX alters marketing
strategic emphasis, causing shifts in the firm’s marketing intensity, and consequently its
marketing efficiency. However, this is a problematic inclusion for two reasons: (1) marketing
intensity is used in the construction of our DV, Marketing Efficiency; and (2) intensity is
endogenous, being that firms could adjust marketing activity as a function of observed or
expected efficiency of that investment.
In order to address this issue, we rely on Wooldridge’s (2002) instrumentation approach,
instrumenting marketing intensity in our model with the residuals of a first-stage regression of
marketing intensity as a function of all endogenous and exogenous variables present in equation
(7) as well as two lagged periods of intensity itself. After this instrumentation, a series of DurbinWu-Hausman tests indicates that no variables are endogenous.
Several interactions are also included in the marketing efficiency model. The interaction
between Brand Equity, the Post-SOX period, and the USA indicator variable is of particular
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interest, as it provides a specific contrast of the post-SOX marketing efficiency of firms with
increasing brand equity, allowing a direct test of H3.
Finally, new variables are included in the second and third levels of our hierarchical
model. At the second level, the difference in marketing efficiency between firms is partially
explained by the introduction of SOX, brand equity, and marketing intensity. Similarly, at the
third level, the difference in marketing efficiency across industries is partially explained by the
concentration of marketing intensity in the industry. Note that these variables are also present in
the first level of the model, as they explain not only differences between firms and industries, but
also some of the differences in marketing efficiency across time intervals.

Results
Table 2 reports correlations between the variables in our study. While a number of the IVs are
correlated at a relatively high level, this is not a major concern, since we are not particularly
interested in the precise coefficient values, but instead simply want to account for their effects.
(For example, the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX trend variables are moderately correlated by
construction. This is a mechanical result of the fact that when Post-SOX = 0, then Pre-SOX will
generally have a negative value, whereas when Pre-SOX = 0, Post-SOX will generally be
positive.)
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Table 2: Correlations between Variables
1. Strategic
Marketing
Emphasis
2. Marketing
Efficiency
3. Pre-SOX
4. Post-SOX
5. Debt
6. EBIT
7. Firm Size
(Employees
in Thousands)
8. Δ GDP 1yr
9. Δ GDP 2yr
10. Index Return
1yr
11. Index Return
2yr
12. Brand Equity
13. Marketing
Intensity HHI

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

0.16

0.17

8.40
–1.71
2.17
349.42
541.02

6

7

8

45.08
2.47
2.64
1896
2333

–0.08
–0.07
–0.04
–0.06
–0.07

–0.01
–0.01
0.01
0.02

0.57
0.05
0.05

0.06
0.07

0.34

12.71
13.26
19.30

38.40
220
211

–0.06
0.01
0.01

0.01
0.01
0.00

–0.01
–0.11
–0.06

0.00
–0.08
–0.05

3015.43

12794

0.09

0.01

0.00

3481.53
1.40

11543
2.45

0.11
0.03

0.02
–0.09

0.08

0.16

0.10

0.03

9

10

11

0.43
–0.01
–0.01

0.43
0.00
0.00

–0.01
–0.02

0.63

–0.13

–0.04

0.01

–0.08

0.41

0.42

0.08
0.00

–0.01
–0.03

–0.06
–0.02

0.01
0.02

–0.10
–0.04

0.16
–0.03

0.34
–0.03

0.86
–0.06

–0.08

–0.02

0.01

–0.01

0.03

–0.01

0.04

0.07

0.26

0.34

12

–0.18
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Strategic Marketing Emphasis
We used Stata’s mixed models procedure to estimate our models. The coefficient estimates for
the strategic marketing emphasis models are presented in table 3, along with t-values and
associated significance levels.
The null model (model 1) shown in table 3 is a baseline for comparison with more
complex models. Model 2 adds our five main independent variables, representing the pre- and
post-SOX growth rates and their interaction with the USA indicator variable. Model 3 adds the
control variables and represents a significant improvement over model 2 (χ2 (7) = 992.26, p <
0.001). 9 This model shows a nonsignificant pre-SOX growth rate in strategic marketing
emphasis for UK-based firms (π 1 = −0.0006, n.s.), while their post-SOX growth rate is negative
and significant (π 2 = −0.0022, p < 0.05), highlighting a shift toward increasing R&D investments
around the introduction of SOX. For American firms, we see a similarly nonsignificant (π 3 =
−0.0015, n.s.) pre-SOX growth rate in strategic marketing emphasis; however, this is followed
by a positive and significant (π 4 = 0.0024, p < 0.05) post-SOX growth rate, indicating an
increasing relative investment in marketing activities and value appropriation. This represents a
significant shift in the trend in strategic marketing emphasis between the pre- and post-SOX
periods relative to the UK control group (χ2 (1) = 28.46, p < 0.001).
A few of the control variables are also significant. Larger firms appear to invest more
heavily in R&D (π 5 = −0.0001, p < 0.10), although the impact of size given the remainder of our
controls is small and only marginally significant. Furthermore, American firms on average invest
more in R&D than their UK counterparts (π 12 = −0.0561, p < 0.0001).

9

When one model is a restricted version of another, the reduction in deviance-based criterion (e.g., AIC, BIC) that is
associated with an increase in the number of independent predictors (reflected in an increase in df) is chi-square
distributed. We use the difference in the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) for our tests of model improvement.
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Table 3: Strategic Marketing Emphasis as a Function of SOX Factors and Controls (N = 17,619)

Variable
Intercept
Rate of Change Pre-SOX
Rate of Change Post-SOX
Rate of Change Pre-SOX in the USA
Rate of Change Post-SOX in the USA
Company Size
Debt
EBIT
GDP Change Lag 1
GDP Change Lag 2
Index Return Lag 1
Index Return Lag 2
USA
Random Effects
Residual (level 1) (e tik )
Firm (level 2) (r 0ik )
SME – Lag 1 (r 1ik )
SME – Lag 2 (r 2ik )
Industry (level 3) (u 00k )
AIC
BIC
DF

Model 1: Null
Model 2: Rates of Change
Parameter
t-value
Parameter
0.1339 ***
17.54
0.1665 ***
0.0015
–0.0031 ***
–0.0037 ***
0.0032 ***

–0.0452 ***
0.0020 ***
76.06
0.0068 ***
12.36
0.3267 ***
16.66
0.0304 ***
8.31
0.0022 ***
3.54
–42353.26
–42285.06
9

Model 3: Full
t-value
Parameter
18.18
0.1799 ***
1.59
–0.0006
–5.08
–0.0022 *
–3.67
–0.0015
5.08
0.0024 *
–0.0001 #
–0.0000 ***
–0.0000
–0.0000 ***
0.0000 *
0.0000 *
–0.0000 ***
–7.31
–0.0561 ***

0.0020 ***
3.49
0.0062 ***
12.42
0.3127 ***
16.51
0.0292 ***
8.24
0.0022 ***
76.11
–42338.46
–42282.37
14

0.0020 ***
0.0058 ***
0.3097 ***
0.0267 ***
0.0021 **
–41448.51
–41290.11
21

t-value
15.97
–0.45
–2.39
–1.09
2.53
–1.94
–4.04
–1.38
–4.39
2.13
2.13
–3.28
–6.20
3.49
16.54
7.57
12.23
74.52

Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, # p < .10.
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All of the included random effects shown near the bottom of table 3 for all three models
are significant, reinforcing the appropriateness of using a hierarchical modeling structure, since
these significant effects indicate unexplained variance at all three levels. Furthermore, by
splitting the error term into temporal, firm, and industry components, we are able to determine
how much of the variance in strategic marketing emphasis is explained by each level. According
to model 3, strategic marketing emphasis variance is split into 19.8 percent temporal (level 1,
e tik ), 57.09 percent firm-specific (level 2, r 0ik ), and 23.1 percent industry-specific variance
components (level 3, u 00k ). Finally, the inclusion of lagged values for strategic emphasis is also
validated by the results in table 3, as both the first and second lags are positive and significant
across all of our models, meaning that the differences in strategic emphasis across firms in any
given time are largely explained by each firm’s previous strategic emphasis (i.e., we are correctly
accounting for path dependency: the fact that firms cannot shift immediately, but are instead
constrained somewhat by previous decisions).
As noted earlier, the pre-SOX period exhibits a null rate of change in strategic marketing
emphasis for both US- and UK-based firms, indicating that prior to the introduction of the
Sarbanes-Oxley law, firms were stable in their allocation decision between value creation
(research and development) and value appropriation (marketing spending intensity) investments.
In contrast, during the post-SOX period, the American annual rate of change is significant,
indicating that the average American firm shifted its strategic emphasis toward increasing
marketing investments and value appropriation. (As the United Kingdom serves as our control
group, we must account for this main effect, −0.0022 plus the differential provided by American
firms, .0024, which gives us a post-SOX net effect for American firms of .0002, χ2 (1) = 13.09, p
< 0.01). This post-SOX shift supports H1. It is important to note that those firms that were not
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subject to SOX (i.e., the UK-based firms) exhibited an opposite behavior by increasingly
emphasizing value creation, something that we argued as being riskier and discouraged by the
SOX legislation, perhaps as an opportunistic move against the more restricted American
counterparts that now face a higher relative cost for risky investments.

Marketing Efficiency
Table 4 shows the results of our model of marketing efficiency. First, the rate of change in the
pre-SOX period for UK firms is negative and significant (π 1 = −0.0148, p < 0.01) but is followed
by a positive and significant rate of change in efficiency in the post-SOX period (π 2 = 0.0141,
p < 0.01). This is consistent with the results seen in strategic emphasis, where an average shift in
emphasis toward value creation should mean less pressure and competition in the marketing
arena and subsequently a greater return to marketing investments. Conversely, for American
firms, we see a positive but nonsignificant change in efficiency in the pre-SOX period (π 3 =
0.0086, n.s.), followed by a negative and significant rate of change in marketing efficiency in the
post-SOX period (π 4 = −0.0140, p < 0.01). Once again, this represents a significant shift in the
trend between the pre- and post-SOX periods relative to the UK control group (χ2 (1) = 4.39,
p < 0.05), providing empirical support for H2. The overall effect of SOX on the firm’s marketing
efficiency will also depend on the firm’s brand equity, marketing intensity, and industry-wide
marketing conditions, as described below.
Looking at the impact of brand equity, we see that there is a differential relative to the
country in question, with UK firms having less efficient marketing with increasing brand equity
(π 7 = −0.0799, p < 0.001) as measured by price premiums, and their American counterparts
observing no advantage in efficiency due to brand equity (π 8 = 0.0729, p < 0.001, and relative to
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Table 4: Model of Marketing Efficiency
Variable
Intercept
Rate of Change Pre-SOX
Rate of Change Post-SOX
Rate of Change Pre-SOX in the USA
Rate of Change Post-SOX in the USA
Marketing Intensity HHI
Marketing Intensity HHI Post-SOX
Brand Equity
Brand Equity in the USA
Brand Equity Post-SOX
Brand Equity Post-SOX in the USA
Brand Equity2
Brand Equity2 in the USA
Brand Equity2 Post-SOX in the USA
Sales Lag 1
Sales Lag 2
GDP Change Lag 1
GDP Change Lag 2
Index Return Lag 1
Index Return Lag 2
Marketing Intensity (instrumented)
USA
Random Effects
Residual (level 1) (e tik )
Firm (level 2) (r 0ik )
Pre-SOX (r 1ik )
Post-SOX (r 2ik )
Brand Equity (r 3ik )
Marketing Intensity (r 4ik )
Industry (level 3) (u 00k )
Marketing Intensity HHI (u 1ik )
AIC
BIC
DF

Parameter
1.8457 ***
–0.0148 **
0.0141 **
0.0086
–0.0140 **
0.4341 ***
–0.0298 ***
–0.0799 ***
0.0729 ***
0.0009
–0.0059 ***
0.0002
–0.0017
0.0002 **
0.0000 ***
–0.0000
0.0000 #
–0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.8793 ***
–0.0579

t-value
28.00
–2.64
2.96
1.43
–2.86
5.07
–3.36
–4.61
4.02
0.69
–3.52
1.09
–0.79
2.98
6.07
–1.61
1.51
–0.80
1.32
0.76
17.90
–1.30

0.0128 ***
0.3541 ***
0.0022 ***
0.0017 ***
0.0076 ***
9.0852 ***
0.0809 ***
0.1177 *
–6215
–5920
40

59.51
19.02
13.21
15.94
6.70
18.85
3.03
2.02

the reference group a χ2 (1) = 1.55, p = 0.21. However, we have a greater interest in the impact of
SOX on this relationship. In the post-SOX period, we see a negative impact of brand equity on
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marketing efficiency for American firms (π 10 = −0.0059, p < 0.001), indicating that SOX hurt the
marketing efficiency of high equity brands even more, which is counter to what we predicted in
hypothesis 3. The hypothesized protective effect of strong brands is actually only true for the
larger values of brand equity, as shown in the quadratic term (π 11 = 0.0002, p < 0.001), providing
evidence that the relationship between a firm’s brand equity and its ability to insulate itself from
legislative shocks like SOX is more nuanced than expected, only partially supporting H3.
The model also suggests that functioning within an industry with a high concentration of
marketing intensity (i.e., with the bulk of marketing investment coming from few members of
the industry, and arguably low noise) provides a large improvement for a firm’s marketing
efficiency (π 5 = 0.4341, p < 0.001), but it further suggests that this advantage was reduced in the
post-SOX period (π 6 = −0.0298, p < 0.001). This is consistent with the argument that new firms
enter this marketing competition and increase their share of voice in the post-SOX period, thus
decreasing the value of marketing concentration and the advantage garnered by it. In fact, a
check in mean industry marketing intensity concentration before and after SOX does show a
statistically significant decrease (t = 2.008, p = 0.0223). Furthermore, marketing intensity is
positive and significant (π 10 = 1.8793, p < 0.001), showing that firms investing the most heavily
in marketing are likely the ones that can extract the greatest returns from this investment (i.e.,
they are more efficient users of their marketing budgets).

Robustness Checks
Alternative Control Group
In order to test whether the effects found so far in our study can be attributed to Sarbanes-Oxley,
we make use of the law’s selective application by replicating our study for US firms having less
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than $75 million in assets. Under the provisions of SOX, these firms are exempt from this
specific regulation. The resulting growth rates are shown in figure 1, both for the original sample
of SOX-compliant firms and this new sample of smaller firms. The exempt (small) firms have
nonsignificant growth rates in strategic marketing emphasis for both periods surrounding the
introduction of SOX (pre-SOX, π 1 = 0.003, p = 0.242; post-SOX, π 2 = −0.001, p = 0.161),
indicating that the average small firm remained unchanged in its allocation of resources between
R&D and marketing across the entire 17-year period (i.e., nonsignificant, or zero growth rate
prior to, and following SOX). This is markedly different from the pattern for those firms required
to comply with SOX legislation (as shown in our main study) and supports our contention that
SOX itself has had a substantial impact on firms’ strategic marketing emphases.

Figure 1: Strategic Marketing Emphasis Growth Rates for Firms Affected by SOX
Compared to Those Not Affected by SOX
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Figure 2: Marketing Intensity and R&D Growth Rates as Components of Strategic
Marketing Emphasis, Surrounding the Introduction of SOX in 2002
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Strategic marketing emphasis measures the trade-off between investments in R&D (as a value
creation activity) and marketing (as a value appropriation activity). Since previous research has
shown that the increased environmental risk brought on by the introduction of SOX has reduced
investments in R&D (Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009), the results shown thus far could be a
direct reflection of this shift alone. In order to determine whether this known effect was the only
factor driving firms’ strategic change, we applied our full model separately to the growth rates in
firm marketing intensity and R&D expenses, each as a proportion of the firm’s total assets. The
resulting growth rates are shown in figure 2. As the figure indicates, investment in marketing
(relative to assets) had been declining in the period prior to the introduction of SOX (negative
growth rate π 1ik = −0.0024, p < 0.001); following the introduction of SOX, firms reversed this
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previous trend and began to invest in marketing more heavily (positive growth rate π 2ik = 0.0004,
p < 0.05). Combining these findings with the results reported earlier, along with the effects of
SOX reported in other published studies, we can conclude that firm strategy changed in response
to SOX, not just due to risk-averse reductions in R&D, but also due to simultaneous increases in
marketing investments.

Discussion
The purpose of our study is to examine the potential benefit of strong brands as a buffer against
negative consequences of unanticipated environmental shifts. We do so by considering the
imposition of new legislations as a systematic shock that significantly alters a firm’s business
environment, either by imposing new restrictions or by altering the cost/payoff structure that
firms face. We then suggest that firms respond in a homogenous manner due to mandatory
compliance and equal application of the law’s incentives/disincentives for all firms falling under
the new regulation. We hypothesize that this homogeneity in action reduces the efficiency of
marketing investments, except for firms that have existing strong brands. We then test our
hypotheses, focusing on the impact of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a
significant piece of legislation with firm-level consequences but without marketing-specific
provisions.
As predicted, we find that, on average, firms shifted their investment trajectories toward
value appropriation activities and away from value creation following the introduction of SOX in
2002. Interestingly, our further analysis of the components of firms’ strategic marketing
emphasis indicates that while the relative intensity of marketing spending was fairly stable prior
to the introduction of SOX, the introduction of additional risk into the environment immediately
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changed this, leading to greater investment in marketing. This important insight highlights that
changes in firm strategy after the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley are not driven solely by already
known and expected cuts to riskier R&D investments, but also by a growing reliance on
marketing activity as a means to manage this increase in the firm’s risk exposure.
We further show that the concentration of marketing investment across industries
diminished after the introduction of SOX, as more firms entered the advertising space and/or
increased their marketing budgets (in line with the overall shift toward increased marketing
spending and greater value appropriation noted previously). This change in the landscape was
accompanied by a decrease in firms’ marketing efficiency, as they found their activities to be less
effective. However, those firms that had created the largest values of brand equity prior to the
introduction of SOX were found to maintain their marketing efficiency better than those firms
that had made no such investment.
Thus, this study adds to the extensive literature on the advantages of strong brands. More
specifically, it adds to the much smaller subset of studies highlighting the role of brands as a
buffer against negative consequences, whether firm specific (e.g., a product recall or a service
failure) or a broad-based environmental shift like the one examined here.
This is also the first study in marketing to consider the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 itself and its implications for US firms, both in terms of strategy-setting and the
accompanying consequences to marketing performance (i.e., the efficiency of marketing
investments). The discussion surrounding this event has been rich and contentious within the
accounting and finance literatures, highlighting how the environment has become riskier since
July 2002, but its implications for marketing have not previously been explored. Our study
contributes to this growing domain by introducing marketing consequences, such as increased
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marketing investment and loss of efficiency, to the implications of SOX for American firms.
Furthermore, by considering legislative change as an influencing factor on firms’ strategic
marketing choice between value creation and value appropriation activities, we also answer the
call set forth by Mizik and Jacobson (2003) to explore conditions leading firms to significantly
shift their strategic emphases.

Managerial Implications
What do these findings mean for firms and their managers? First, managers need to be concerned
about compliance with changing legislation and think strategically about its implications for both
their own firms and for their key competitors. The importance of such legislation for marketing
comes from three primary characteristics of this landscape-altering force: (1) it is coercive, in
that all firms under its coverage must comply; (2) compliance is required in the short term; and
(3) the applicability of new laws can be targeted rather than universal (e.g., SOX applies to a
subset of American firms). Taken together, these characteristics mean that a firm facing new
legislation will also observe rapid changes in competitor behavior, although not necessarily from
every competing firm or across all markets where the firm operates.
For instance, the imposition of SOX has changed how managers think of the boundaries
of their firms. Many directors have increasingly looked to outsource risky projects and shrink
internal R&D operations (i.e., value-creation activities). Many have even considered going
private (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007) or “going dark” (i.e., deregistering their stock; Leuz,
Triantis, and Wang 2008). As a result, managers who have been able to manage outsourcing
activities or who have been adept at managing merger and acquisition opportunities should thrive
in this new environment as firms that limit internal R&D investments look for new ways to

38

benefit from value creation done externally. These conditions also provide one incentive toward
the formation of networked entities, where a number of allied but independent firms coordinate
toward a common goal. As such, the firm’s ability to identify, manage, and leverage such value
networks could be incrementally more valuable in a time of change due to legislative influence.
Furthermore, SOX exemplifies the potentially uneven application of the law since it
targets larger firms (>$75 million) in the United States. Our research shows that this targeting
drives a shift in large firms from value creation to value appropriation. At the same time, it
creates opportunities for both foreign (UK) and smaller (< $75 million) firms that are willing to
take on riskier projects, since these firms are not required to comply with SOX. In the longer
term, niche firms may be able to tap into new growth opportunities because they are small and
face less onerous regulation. As for large firms, R&D investment may dichotomize, with most
firms deemphasizing internal R&D while other firms evolve into compliance specialists that are
able to adapt to shifting institutional risks.
It is possible that in this new, post-SOX environment, US firms are trading away their
future (R&D) for immediate gains (advertising), jeopardizing their future as well as the wellbeing of all of their stakeholders (suppliers, employees, customers) and shareholders (e.g.,
Rubera and Tellis 2014). SOX may also make US firms vulnerable to innovative foreign
competitors that can leverage their size without having to comply with or face a riskier
environment created by SOX.
It is also worth considering that the introduction of new legislation like SOX could
function as a homogenizing force in the marketplace. In equilibrium, firms will seek to maximize
their individual goals (e.g., profit, sales, market share, etc.) given their individual resources,
capability constraints, and market conditions. And while the firm’s individual resources and

39

capabilities allow it to differentiate itself, the market provides an opposite force, where specific
conditions might call for similar strategic responses, thus forcing firms to move closer together.
Our results conform to this view, given the movement of firms toward greater emphasis on value
appropriation and heavier advertising spending in general in response to the riskier environment
created by SOX. While individual differences between firms will still allow for differentiation in
deployment and execution of similar strategies, managers need to be aware that the impact of this
increased strategic competition will reduce their firms’ return on marketing investment.
With the introduction of SOX, firms invested more heavily in marketing initiatives, and
our results confirm that, on average, firms experienced a lower return on marketing spending
following the introduction of SOX (i.e., reduced efficiency), primarily due to the increased
competition for share of voice. Interestingly, this loss in efficiency was partially mitigated for
firms able to leverage preexisting brand equity in order to fight off the incursion of increased
advertising spending. This result highlights the power of brand-building strategies available to
marketing managers and their ability to maintain firm differentiation in the face of homogenizing
forces, allowing managers to make one additional argument for their often-threatened advertising
budgets: the creation of brand equity through brand-based advertising can create a protective tool
against unforeseen increases in environmental risk. However, it is also important to note that this
protective effect may only exist for very strong brands.

Research Implications
Marketing researchers have traditionally focused primarily on industry-based competition and on
how companies utilize their firm-specific resources, while largely neglecting the institutional
conditions that firms face. However, our work shows that these conditions can have a profound
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impact on firm strategy as well as on the value of brands as protective barriers to competitive
actions. Furthermore, they have the potential to influence both the firm’s competitive setting and
the nature of the resources that provide it with advantage. Thus, more work is needed that looks
at how marketing is affected by institutional constraints.
The strategic marketing emphasis of the firm, or the resource allocation decision between
marketing efforts and R&D investments, is a key variable of interest for marketing researchers
interested in exploring firm and marketing performance. The understanding that emphasis can be
shifted due to institutional pressure rather than through agency alone can add nuance and further
understanding to studies exploring the impact of firms’ strategic emphases.
Furthermore, this institutional interference provides a serious challenge for firms
attempting to achieve and maintain ambidexterity, or the simultaneous pursuit of both value
creation and value appropriation. Ambidexterity has been shown to be important in the
profitability of larger firms (Voss and Voss 2013)—that is, those specifically targeted by SOX.
As noted in the managerial implications discussion, corporate responses to SOX will continue to
evolve, and their strategic emphases will shift. At the same time, the differences between larger
and smaller companies are likely to further diverge. It will therefore be important to track firms’
responses over time.
On a positive note, the relative strategic emphasis on value appropriation has been shown
to improve customer satisfaction (Song, Vadakkepatt, and Lehmann 2012), given the three roles
of advertising identified in past research: persuasion, information, and prestige (Bagwell 2007)
and the increased utility consumers derive from the prestige associated with the brands they use.
As such, these institutional pressures might lead to greater short-term performance (both in terms
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of marketing satisfaction and financial gains), but at a potential cost to long-term survival, as
noted earlier.

Conclusion
Brands have been shown not only to enhance the outcome of positive marketing initiatives, but
also to mitigate the downside consequences of negative forces. Hunt and Morgan (1995) suggest
that new laws have the capacity to provide such a negative force on marketing practice, yet
marketing scholars know surprisingly little about how major new legislation affects marketing.
Institutional theory suggests that managers (and firms) will adapt quickly to the introduction of
such laws (e.g., Scott 1997). However, few studies have examined marketing responses to new
legislation, or discussed how marketing assets can help the firm navigate new environments.
In this paper, we have focused on how firms have responded to one such legislative
imposition, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SOX has influenced how boards
evaluate and respond to the perceived risks of various business options, resulting in a systematic
shift across firms away from value creation in favor of more value appropriation. This happened
in a homogenous manner, thereby reducing firms’ marketing efficiency, with the exception of
those firms having the strongest of brands. What the legislation means exactly for everyday
marketing practice (e.g., pricing, advertising) is not yet clear, but it seems likely that marketers
will prefer to support and promote well-established brands over radical new products. In the
short term, this preference will maximize cash flow (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998), but
the longer-term performance consequences of this stance are likely to be less satisfactory.
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